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DRAFTING CHARITABLE
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on testamentary planning, we are constantly reminded that
we should not permit the tail of death taxes to wag the dog. Yet, without
doing his client an equal disservice, the estate planner cannot close his
eyes to the erosive effect of death taxes when he is drafting will provisions
designed to achieve non-tax objectives. This is no less true in the framing
of charitable bequests where, once there is a departure from the routine,
the tax problems are numerous and often complex.
From the standpoint of death taxes, the paramount consideration in
most cases is to assure the deductibility of the charitable bequest for
purposes of the federal estate tax. The applicable federal rates are usually
higher than those of the particular state, and, moreover, in many states
the death tax provisions on the deductibility of charitable bequests are
the same as or closely modeled upon the federal law, or the state tax is a
percentage of the federal tax.
N ADVISING

The Draftsman's Approach
The most practical suggestion is that the draftsman approach the problem of assuring deductibility in the frame of mind of a technician. Section
2055 of the Internal Revenue Code, which allows the deduction, does not
sketch a rule in broad, simple strokes. Rather, it specifies with particularity in six subsections and many qualifying clauses the only types of
transfers that will be recognized as deductible, and the challenge to the
draftsman is increased by the presence of treasury regulations that
enumerate a number of pitfalls inferrible from the statute only by the
most careful study and familiarity with the judicial history of the statute
and predecessor enactments. While it is true that the statute is sympathetically administered by the Internal Revenue Service in the general run
of cases, and that the courts have often stretched their power of interpre* A.B., LL.B., Fordham University.
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tation to sustain the deductibility of bequests
that have not strictly adhered to the specified criteria, allowance of the bequest is,
nevertheless, a question of statutory compliance, not one of equity. If the draftsman
wishes to obviate administrative controversy
or litigation he will, whenever he has occasion to draft a bequest that varies from a
simple legacy for a recognized charity, formulate the provision with strict adherence
to the statute or regulations, preferring the
assurance of technical compliance to the
uncertainty of administrative or judicial
grace.
Bequests to Individuals
A problem frequently encountered is the
desire of the testator to include a bequest to
a named clergyman or member of a religious order. The client regards the individual as the personification of the church
or order and assumes the bequest will qualify for the charitable deduction. The draftsman who approaches the problem as a
technician will advise that the bequest must
be made in a different way or the estate tax
deduction may be lost.
The kinds of charitable bequests that will
qualify for the deduction are set forth in
four subdivisions of subsection (a) of section 2055. They describe five categories,
three of which (transfers to governments
and political subdivisions, certain fraternal
societies, orders or associations and certain
veterans' organizations) will be passed over
here. The remaining two, which are discussed here, deal with bequests that may
generally be described as transfers for
charitable purposes.'

A study of the statute shows that if a
bequest for charitable purposes is to be deductible, it must be made either "to or for
the use of any corporation organized and
operated exclusively" for charitable purposes,2 or "to a trustee or trustees ... to be
used by such trustee or trustees ... exclusively" for such purposes.3 From this it is
evident that a bequest to an individual as
such is not deductible, regardless of the
laudable motive of the testator and the commendable occupation of the beneficiary.
The testator who insists that the clergyman
or member of a religious order be named as
the beneficiary must either reconcile himself
to the probability that deduction of the
bequest will be denied, or permit the draftsman to make it clear that the individual is
named as the agent or conduit for a corporation or association of the kind specified, or
as the trustee of a trust for the purposes
specified.
Effect of Vow of Poverty
Until 1955, there was widespread belief
that a bequest to an individual was nevertheless deductible for federal estate tax purposes if the donee happened to be a member
of a religious order who had taken a vow

"organized or operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, including the encouragement of art and the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals."

Subdivision (3), relating to transfers to a trustee
or trustees, provides that the contributions or gifts

must be used for the same purposes except that
there is no explicit reference to "encouragement
of art." These purposes are herein collectively

referred to as "charitable."
2INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2055(a)(2). The

1 Subdivision (2) of § 2055(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code, relating to transfers to or for the
use of corporations, requires that the entity be

treasury regulations broaden the statute by add-

ing "association." Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-1(a)(2)
(1958).
3

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, § 2055(a) (3).

10
of poverty. The reasoning behind this view
was that the bequest was in practical effect
to or for the religious order of which the
donee was a member, since, by reason of
the vow of poverty, the organization would
be the ultimate recipient. The member of
the religious order was looked upon as
merely a conduit who, because of his vow,
had no beneficial interest in the bequest.
This reasoning seemed consistent with a
1919 income tax ruling that held the income
of members of religious orders to be nontaxable when such income was turned over
to their orders because of vows of poverty,
or because they received the income as
agents of the orders.4 This thinking was
apparently strengthened by a 1948 tax court
decision which allowed an income tax deduction for a charitable contribution with
respect to a gift to a member of the Society
of Jesus on the ground that the contribution was to or for the use of the Order
inasmuch as the donee, under his vow of
poverty, was required immediately to turn
5
it over to the Order.
The apparent soundness of this reasoning was shaken in 1955 by the issuance of
two federal estate tax rulings dealing with
property passing to members of religious
orders who had taken vows of poverty. One
ruling concerned a situation where property
passed pursuant to a bequest, 6 and the other
a situation where property passed by intestacy.7 Both rulings held that the value of the
property so passing was not deductible. The
rationale expressed in the first was that "the
property bequeathed to B passed to the religious order by virtue of B's contractual
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agreement with the order rather than by
way of bequest, legacy or devise under the
decedent's will."
Initially, the rulings met with some
skepticism, but this has since been dispelled
by four decisions 8 consistent with the position taken in the revenue rulings. In the first
case, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit denied a deduction for a bequest to a
member of the Society of Jesus who had
taken his solemn perpetual vow of poverty,
remarking that it was the donee's "renunciation and assignment which was to be the
operative dispositive act- as the testatrix
plainly recognized. She did not, as she might
readily have done, by her will create any
interest of any kind, equitable or legal, conditional or executory, in the Society." 9
Bequests for Masses
Although there appears to be no published decision or ruling on the subject, there
seems no cause to question the deductibility
of a bequest for masses where the named
beneficiary is a church or other bona fide
religious corporation or association, or the
trustee of an express trust for that purpose.
Such organizations are among the types
mentioned in section 2055 (a) (2), and the
requisite religious purpose is evidently present where the transfer is in trust.
Such a bequest to an individual not
expressly denominated a trustee raises
questions, but in most, if not all, cases a
deduction would appear warranted because
of the nature of the bequest. Unless the will
shows clearly to the contrary, it seems
evident that the primary motive of the trans8 Cox v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.

4O.D. 119, 1 CUM. BULL. 82 (1919).

1961); Estate of Charles J. Barry, 34 T.C. 160

5L.F. Ratterman, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 476, 496
(1948).
6 Rev. Rul. 55-759, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 607.
1 Rev. Rul. 55-760, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 607.

(1960); Estate of Mary A. Callaghan, 33 T.C.
870 (1960); Estate of George W. Dichtel, 30 T.C.
1258 (1958).
9 Cox v. Commissioner, supra note 8, at 38.
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fer is not to benefit the donee but to obtain
spiritual benefits for all mankind as well as
for the particular person or persons on
whose behalf the masses are to be said.10
There is authority in the decisions of many
state courts for the conclusion that, even if
the individual is not expressly named as a
trustee, the legal effect of such a bequest is
to create a trust for a religious purpose, and
that the individual donee is either a trustee
or a holder of a power in trust.11 Accordingly, such a bequest would appear to comply with the statutory requisite that a
deductible bequest be "to a trustee or
trustees ...to be used by such trustee or
trustees ...exclusively for religious... pur12
poses.
Where the bequest for masses is to an individual, it would seem immaterial whether
the donee is under a vow of poverty. If the
bequest is phrased in such a way that it is
clear that the individual is the real beneficiary of the bequest, the existence of a vow
of poverty should be insufficient to merit
the deduction in view of the rulings and
cases referred to above. On the other hand,
if the language of the bequest admits the
conclusion that it is made to the individual,
either expressly or impliedly, as a trustee or
a holder of a power in trust for the religious
purpose of having masses said, a deduction

10 If the priests who will celebrate the masses are
not subject to vows of poverty, it has been stated
that the stipends received by them will be taxable
income (but this would seem to be merely an
incidental effect). Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(a)
(1958); YOUR FEDERAL INCOME TAX 33 (Int. Rev.
Serv. Publication No. 17, 1964).
11 Scorr, TRUSTS §§ 124.4, 371.5 (2d ed. 1956);
O'Brien & O'Brien, Seventy Years of Bequests for
Masses in New York Courts, 1883-1953, 23 FORDHAM

L. REV. 147 (1954); 1 CATHOLIC

LAW. 156

(1955).
12

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2055 (a)(3).

would seem to be authorized by the statute,
regardless of the absence of a vow of poverty. Indeed, in the latter case, it would not
seem to matter that the individual was
neither a clergyman nor a member of a
religious order. For example, a deduction
would appear warranted for a bequest to an
executor, whether corporate or individual,
who is directed to apply it for the purpose
of having masses said for the repose of the
soul of the testator. A trust or power in
trust for an exclusively religious purpose
would doubtless be deemed to have been
created.
The draftsman who has satisfied the statutory requirements that a charitable transfer
be either to or for the use of a charitable
corporation or association or to a trustee
or trustees for exclusively charitable purposes has by no means come to the end of
the list of problems involved in qualifying
the bequest for the federal estate tax deduction. The balance of the list is long and
includes three other problems - mixed purpose bequests, conditional bequests, and
powers of diversion - which are discussed
13
below.
Mixed Purpose Bequests
Where a bequest is made for both a charitable and a private purpose, no deduction
will be allowed unless the value of the charitable beneficial interest is "presently ascertainable, and hence severable from the
noncharitable interest."1 4 One type of charitable interest that can be separately valued
and, therefore, severed is a gift of a life
estate to an individual, or a gift in trust with
Not discussed here are such matters as the
effect of powers of appointment, death taxes payable out of charitable transfers, and disallowance
because of "prohibited transactions." See Treas.
Reg. §§ 20.2055-1(b), -3, -4 (1958).
14 Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(a) (1958).
13

10
income payable to an individual for life or
a term of years with the remainder interest
in either case given to charity. Since the
present value of the charitable remainder
interest can be ascertained by reference to

appropriate valuation factors, it is deductible under the statute. 15
A bequest to individuals with a provision
that they make suitable charitable gifts out
of the property received by them, but without a direction as to the amount or portion
of the bequeathed property that must necessarily be given to charity, will not, however,
qualify, since the extent to which charitable
organizations will benefit is left solely to the
judgment of the legatees. At the time of
decedent's death, there is no assurance that
the charitable beneficiaries will receive any
allocable part of the bequest and there is,
therefore, no basis upon which the value
of the charitable beneficial interest can be
ascertained. This is so even if the legatees
comply with the wish of the testator and
actually distribute sums to charitable corporations. As the owners of the property, they
would have made charitable contributions
which could be recognized for purposes of
their own income tax liabilities, but no
estate tax deduction would be allowable to
the estate of the testator.' 6 Such a bequest
is, however, distinguishable from one where
executors are directed to distribute the
entire amount of a bequest or a specified
part among charitable corporations or associations referred to in the statute since, in
the latter case, there is the requisite assurance that a definite amount will pass to
charity. This would appear to be so even
- Ibid. This section contains a cross-reference to
tables in § 20.2031-7 relating to the valuation of
annuities, life estates, terms for years, remainders
and reversions.
16 Rev. Rul. 55-335, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 455.
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if the executors have discretion to select
the particular charitable beneficiaries, and
even if they also have the discretion to determine the proportions in which selected
charities would benefit."
Conditional Bequests
The inclusion in a charitable bequest of a
condition that might prevent or interfere
with that charitable use jeopardizes deductibility for federal estate tax purposes unless
the circumstances are such that there is an
assurance that charity will receive the bequest or some determinable part of it.18

If the contingency is stated in the form
of a condition precedent, requiring the performance of some act or happening of a
stated event in order for the bequest to
become effective, the bequest will not be
deductible "unless the possibility that the
charitable transfer will not become effective
is so remote as to be negligible." 19 The
evaluation of such possibility is to be made
as of the date of decedent's death and, as
a general rule, it is immaterial if in fact the
20
charitable transfer later becomes effective.
17 See

Parsons, How Specific Must A Charitable
Bequest Be To Be Deductible?, N.YU. 16TH INST.
ON FED. TAX 923 (1958).
isCommissioner v. Estate of Sternberger, 348
U.S. 187 (1955).

"9Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(b) (1958).
20 See First Trust Co. v. Reynolds, 137 F.2d 518

(8th Cir. 1943), where deductions were disallowed for bequests to charity subject to the widow's express written consent despite the fact that
such consent was given and the bequests were in
fact paid to charity before the due date of the
federal estate tax return. See also Rev. Rul.
64-129, 1964 INT. REV. BULL. No. 17, at 11, to
the same effect, since such a bequest lacks "the
necessary completeness and reality at the date of
testator's death because of its dependency upon
the volitional act of a third party." It should be
noted, however, that § 2055(a) also allows a deduction for an interest which becomes part of a
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A deduction will not be allowed, for example, for a gift of a charitable remainder
interest that is to take effect only if a named
person predeceases other named persons, at
least where the actuarial chance that the
21
charity will not take is substantial.
There is a similar rule with respect to the
imposition of conditions subsequent. If a
bequest is vested in a charity at the time of
decedent's death, but could be defeated by
the later performance of some act or the
happening of some event, a deduction will
not be allowed, unless the occurrence "appeared to have been highly improbable at
the time of decedent's death."22 One example of a disqualifying condition subsequent
would be a bequest of a remainder interest
to charity, subject to being defeated if the
life tenant, who had no living issue at the
time of the decedent's death, were survived
by issue, 23 unless at the time of decedent's
death such issue was a medical impossibility.' 4
Powers of Diversion
In keeping with the philosophy that the
allowance of a deduction will depend upon
charitable bequest as a result of an irrevocable
disclaimer "if the disclaimer is made before the
date prescribed for the filing of the estate tax

return." The subsection also provides that the
complete termination before such date of "a
power to consume, invade, or appropriate prop-

erty for the benefit of an individual before such
power has been exercised" will be considered and
deemed to be an irrevocable disclaimer.
21See United States v. Dean, 224 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.

1955), which denied a deduction where the actuarial chance of the charity not taking was one in
eleven.
22Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(b) (1958).
23Commissioner v. Estate of Sternberger, supra
note 18.
24 See United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291
U.S. 272 (1934), where there was inability to

bear children because of surgery.

the existence at the time of testator's death
of assurance that charity will receive the
bequest or some determinable part of it, the
Treasury Regulations provide that where
anyone is empowered to divert the bequest
in whole or in part to a noncharitable use
or purpose, "the deduction will be limited
to that portion, if any, of the property or
fund which is exempt from an exercise of
the power." 2" One quite obvious example
would be a bequest to charity of all of the
furniture and furnishings located in the decedent's residence at the time of his death,
coupled with a provision giving a named
relative the right at any time within two
years after the date of death to select any
part or all of such property for his own use
and benefit. 26
In the case of bequests in trust, the limitation on the deduction can operate both as
to the principal and the income. While a
bequest to charity of the income of a trust
for a term of years would ordinarily be
susceptible of valuation and consequently
deductible, the deduction would be defeated
if there was a discretionary power in the
trustee or anyone else to pay the trust in27
come to or for a noncharitable beneficiary.
Similarly, a charitable remainder interest
will not be deductible if there is a discre(Continued on page 226)
25Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(b) (1958).
An irrevocable disclaimer could preserve the
deduction if it became effective before the due
date of the federal estate tax return. The period
presently prescribed is fifteen months after the
decedent's death, unless an extension of time has
been granted. See Treas. Reg. § 20.6075-1 (1958),
2r6

relating to the time for filing the return. But see
note 19 supra.

27 The regulations give the less obvious example

of a trust funded by stock of a closely-held corporation where there is no assurance that there
will be the requisite enjoyment of income by the
charity. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(b) (1958).

